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PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION-EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT-SEX

CRIMINATION IN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS-The

Dis-

Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania has declared unconstitutional that portion of Pennsylvania's Adoption Act requiring only the consent of the mother in
proceedings for the adoption of an illegitimate child as creating an
impermissible distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers in violation of the equal rights amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
A child was born out of wedlock to Robert Walker and Jean Cole
in 1970. The parents subsequently separated and executed a formal
support agreement whereby Walker paid support and was given
weekly visitation rights.' Jean Cole later married and her husband
filed a petition to adopt the child. After a hearing, at which Walker
was neither present nor given actual notice, and at which no testimony was offered to support termination of his parental rights, the
orphans' court entered a decree of adoption. Upon learning of the
decree, Walker filed, in the same court which decreed the adoption,
an application for a rule to show cause why the case should not be
reversed and remanded for a rehearing. 2 The rule was answered and
after a hearing where it was stipulated that Walker had not con-

sented to the adoption, the court discharged the rule. The orphans'
court held that section 411 of the Adoption Act of 19701 permitted
the adoption of an illegitimate child without the consent of the
unwed father and without his being notified of the adoption proceedings.' Walker appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court,5 challenging the constitutionality of the statute on grounds
of substantive and procedural discrimination against unwed fathers

in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con1. At the hearing on Walker's application for a rule to show cause why the adoption should
not be reversed, it was stipulated that he had fully exercised his visitation rights, and was
visiting his child each week in accordance with his visitation schedule. Adoption of Walker,
468 Pa. 165, 168, 360 A.2d 603, 604 (1976).
2. Id.
3. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
4. Adoption of P.J.W., 97 Dauph. Co. 409 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1975).
5. Direct appeals to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from the courts of common pleas
are permitted in matters decided in the orphans' court division. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
211.202(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
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stitution' and the equal rights amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution (ERA).7
Justice Roberts wrote for the majority' and determined that
Walker involved two issues, the primary issue being whether a natural father's consent is necessary for the adoption of his illegitimate
child.9 The court observed that an unwed father's consent to the
adoption of his child is not required by the Adoption Act. 0 As a
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. PA. CONST. art. I, § 28, popularly known as the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), was
enacted on May 18, 1971. It provides: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied
or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual."
The appellee did not defend the constitutionality of the Adoption Act provision but argued
that Walker was barred from raising the question since he failed to give the Attorney General
of Pennsylvania notice of the challenge in accordance with PA. R. Civ. P. 235. The Rule
requires a party challenging the constitutionality of an Act of Assembly to give notice to the
Attorney General, who may intervene as a party. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Adoption of
Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976). The court did not discuss this issue in its opinion.
8. Justices Pomeroy and Nix concurred in the result without opinion; Chief Justice Jones
did not participate in the decision.
9. 468 Pa. at 167, 360 A.2d at 604. The court also considered whether the notice given
Walker of the adoption proceedings was sufficient. The orphans' court division which decreed
the adoption directed that Walker be given notice of the pending hearing by registered mail
to his last known address. A letter was sent to an address Walker had supplied the Domestic
Relations Board of Dauphin County, but was returned marked: "Moved, left no address."
Id. at 167-68, 360 A.2d at 604. No further attempt was made to notify him of the hearing. In
discharging Walker's rule to show cause why the adoption should not be reversed, the orphans' court which originally directed that Walker be given notice held that he was not
entitled to notice of the adoption proceeding and that, in any event, the mailed notice
satisfied" any right to notice he may have had. Id. at 169, 360 A.2d at 605. On appeal, the
appellee argued that even if Walker's consent was necessary, any deficiency in the proceedings regarding Walker's rights was cured by the notice given. The supreme court, as a corollary to its holding that Walker's consent to the adoption of his illegitimate child was required,
held that notice of the adoption proceedings was also necessary. Id. Noting that Walker could
easily have been personally served on one of his weekly visits, the court held the notice given
to be invalid under the circumstances; one could not rely on mailed notice which clearly did
not reach the party to be notified when another, effective form of notice was available. Id. at
173, 360 A.2d at 607.
Moreover, regardless of whether Walker received adequate notice of the proceedings, no
evidence was presented to the orphans' court upon which his parental rights could have been
involuntarily terminated. Id. at 172, 360 A.2d at 606. The court observed that Walker's
consent was not obtained and that sending notice to an unwed mother does not relieve the
burden of presenting sufficient evidence at the hearing to terminate her parental rights when
her consent to an adoption is not obtained. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 311 (Purdon Supp.
1977-1978). In the court's view, there was no valid basis for imposing a lighter burden on a
party seeking to terminate the rights of an unwed father. Thus, the court rejected the appellee's contention that the notice given cured the otherwise deficient proceeding. 468 Pa. at 17273, 360 A.2d at 606-07.
10. The Act provides in relevant part:
In the case of an illegitimate child, the consent of the mother only shall be necessary.
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consequence, his parental rights could be terminated without fulfilling the statutory requirements mandated for the involuntary termination of the rights of other parents, since that section of the Act
applies only to parents whose consent to an adoption is required."
In the court's view, this denied unwed fathers important substantive and procedural rights accorded unwed mothers and married
parents. Thus, that portion of the statute requiring only the consent
of the mother as a precondition to the adoption of an illegitimate
child 2 was held unconstitutional as violative of the equal rights
amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 3 Although federal
constitutional law compelled a similar result, 4 the court chose to
rest its decision solely on the Pennsylvania ERA; both prior ERA
decisions"s and the underlying purpose of the ERA-to end discrimiThe consent of the natural father of a child who was illegitimate at birth shall be
required only if the relationship between mother and child was terminated by a decree
entered after the marriage of the mother and the natural father.
1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411(3) (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
11. Notice of an adoption hearing must be given to all persons whose required consent
has not been obtained. Id. § 421. Parental rights can be involuntarily terminated upon a
finding of abandonment or neglect. Id. § 311.
12. In enacting the Adoption Act of 1970, the Pennsylvania legislature declared the provisions of the Act to be severable, so that in the event any provision was held invalid, the
remainder would be unaffected. Id. § 103. The court therefore struck only the offending
portions of § 411. See 468 Pa. at 171 n.10, 360 A.2d at 606 n.10.
13. 468 Pa. at 170-71, 360 A.2d at 605-06.
14. Walker based his arguments on appeal almost exclusively upon federal constitutional
law. He alleged that by virtue of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), the Adoption Act, in not requiring his consent to the adoption
of his child, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. In Stanley, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Illinois statute that presumed
unwed fathers were unsuitable and neglectful parents. Upon the death of the mother, the
statute declared the children wards of the state without any hearing on the father's parental
fitness, and without proof of neglect. Such hearing and proof were required before the state
could assume custody of children of married or divorced parents or unmarried mothers. The
Court held that under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, Stanley was
entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children could be taken from him,
and that to deny him the hearing accorded all other parents constituted a denial of equal
protection. Id. at 649. Although Justice Roberts conceded that Walker and Stanley might be
factually distinguishable, in his view, the differences did not compel a contrary result. 468
Pa. at 171-72 n.11, 360 A.2d at 606 n.11.
Walker limited his treatment of the Pennsylvania ERA to a summary assertion that
"[t]here would appear to be a violation of § 28 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution
which prohibits the denial or abridgement of equality of rights because of sex." Brief for
Appellant at 12, Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603 (1976).
15. The court in Walker cited three cases in which the ERA was invoked to strike down
sex-based classifications. See DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975) (rejecting common law presumption of husband's ownership of household goods used by both
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natory treatment on account of sex'-were cited in support of the
court's finding that the distinction drawn between unwed mothers
and unwed fathers was constitutionally infirm. 7
Walker adds to a growing line of cases in the domestic relations
field in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has drawn upon the
Pennsylvania ERA to strike down sex-based classifications." In the
first of these cases, Conway v. Dana,19 the court rejected the common law presumption that the father has the primary duty of child
support after the parents' separation or divorce. Terming the presumption a vestige of the past incompatible with the present recognition of equality among the sexes, the court invoked the ERA and
declared that both parents have a duty to support minor children
commensurate with their financial capabilities. 20 Hopkins v.
Blanco" established for the wife a right to recover for loss of consortium equal to that long recognized in the husband. After first reaffirming the desirability of the cause of action for the husband, the
supreme court declared that the ERA mandated the extension of the
right of action to the wife. Decided the same year as these two cases,
Henderson v. Henderson22 rejected a portion of Pennsylvania's divorce law which entitled a wife, but not a husband, to an award of
alimony pendent lite, counsel fees, and expenses. Stating that the
purpose of the ERA was to eliminate sex as a basis for legal status,
the court concluded that the law must not impose, insofar as support remedies are concerned, different benefits or burdens on the
spouses); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974) (overruling presumption that
father must bear primary duty for support of minor children); Commonwealth v. Butler, 458
Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974) (describing the purpose and effect of the ERA).
16. 468 Pa. at 171 n.9, 360 A.2d at 606 n.9, citing Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289,
328 A.2d 851 (1974) (describing the purpose of the ERA in those terms).
17. 468 Pa. at 170-71, 360 A.2d at 606.
18. Domestic relations has provided an almost exclusive arena for the court's consideration of the ERA. Indeed, it appears that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has directly applied
the ERA in only one case in an area other than domestic relations. See Commonwealth v.
Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974), discussed at text accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
There are two other cases in the criminal justice area where the ERA appears to have indirectly influenced the court's decision. See Commonwealth v. Staub, 461 Pa. 486, 337 A.2d
258 (1975) (invalidating Pennsylvania's fornication and bastardy statutes which imposed
different penalties on men and women); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 462 Pa. 216, 340 A.2d
440 (1975) (repudiating common law doctrine of coverture).
19. 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
20. Id. at 539, 318 A.2d at 326.
21. 457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 139 (1974).
22. 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974).
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basis of sex.2 3 The following year, DiFlorido v. DiFlorido24 repu-

diated the common law presumption of ownership by the husband
of household property used by both spouses. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found this presumption to be antiquated, and ruled
that all marital property acquired in anticipation of or during marriage and used by both spouses is to be presumed to be held as
entireties property. 5 What can be extrapolated from these cases is
the proposition that legal benefits and burdens in the area of domestic relations must be imposed based upon realistic assessments of
the actual circumstances of the parties rather than upon presumptions based on sex.
The significance of Walker lies not in the fact that the court drew
again upon the Pennsylvania ERA; as the cases evidence, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has shown no reluctance to incorporate the
ERA into the structure of Pennsylvania domestic relations law.
Rather, Walker's importance lies in the standard of review ostensibly adopted by the court in considering the validity of sex-based
classifications. Finding the different treatment accorded unwed
mothers and unwed fathers offensive to the ERA, Justice Roberts
stated: "This distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers is patently invalid under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The only differences between unwed fathers and unwed mothers are
those based on sex. This is an impermissible basis for denying
unwed fathers rights under the Act.

'20

This language, with which

the court held sex-based differences in this context to be an impermissible basis for distinction, suggests that the court is following an
"absolute" approach in interpreting the ERA, whereby sex is a prohibited classification. 27 Once a statutory distinction between the
sexes is found to exist, it is struck down as per se invalid, with no
inquiry into any possible justification for its existence. The fact that
the court in Walker made no attempt to inquire into any justification for the distinction drawn between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers supports this interpretation. If the Pennsylvania Supreme
23. Id. at 101, 327 A.2d at 62.
24. 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975).
25. Id. at 650-51, 331 A.2d at 179-80.
26. 468 Pa. at 170-71, 360 A.2d at 605-06 (emphasis added).
27. The court stated: "In this Commonwealth, sex may no longer be accepted as an
exclusive classifying tool." Id. at 171 n.9, 360 A.2d at 606 n.9, citing Commonwealth v. Butler,
458 Pa. 289, 296, 328 A.2d 851, 855 (1974).
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Court in Walker has indeed construed the ERA in an absolute fashion to render any legal distinction between the sexes per se invalid,
the case represents a major and much needed clarification of the
court's view of the appropriate implementation of the ERA. Prior
decisions interpreting the ERA have not expressly adopted an absolute standard.28
A survey of the amendment's history facilitates an assessment of
Walker's import regarding the ERA's effect on domestic relations.
Before the passage of the Pennsylvania ERA, sex discrimination
claims were decided under the fourteenth amendment.29 Much of
the impetus for an ERA, nationally and in Pennsylvania, came from
dissatisfaction with courts' interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's application in sex discrimination cases,3" particularly the
United States Supreme Court's failure to declare sex a suspect classification." Instead, the Court upheld any classification which could
be construed as reasonable, generally deferring to the legislatures'
judgment. Indeed, up until the Pennsylvania ERA's enactment in
1971, the United States Supreme Court had never declared a statutory sex classification unreasonable and therefore violative of the
28. See Comment, A Review of the Implementation of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights
Amendment, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 683, 716 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Equal Rights Amendment].
29. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 875 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Browni.
30. Id. at 875-82. For a discussion of the movement in Pennsylvania for adoption of the
Pennsylvania ERA see Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 28, at 684-87.
31. See Comment, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HAav. L. REV. 1499, 1503 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Constitutional
Amendment]. The Supreme Court has traditionally used two standards of review in determining the validity of laws differentiating between individuals similarly situated. The first
generally defers to the legislative judgment and upholds "reasonable classifications" as long
as they can be construed as rationally related to a permissible legislative objective. Id. The
second standard, generally referred to as "strict scrutiny," is triggered by "suspect classifications" such as race or national ancestry. Any "suspect classification" bears a heavy burden
of justification and is upheld only if it is necessary, not merely rationally related, to the
accomplishment of a permissible legislative policy. Id.
In the past, many proponents of women's rights hoped that the Supreme Court would label
sex a suspect classification. However, prior to the passage of Pennsylvania's ERA in 1971,
the Supreme Court continued to use a rational basis test to review sex classifications. See
Brown, supra note 29, at 879-80; ConstitutionalAmendment, supra at 1503. The Court has
since then shown an increased sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor and in one case came
close to adopting sex as a suspect classification. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (plurality opinion, four Justices adopting this view). However, to date the Court has
not declared sex to be a suspect classification. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975).
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fourteenth amendment.32 Pennsylvania courts had consistently adhered to the Supreme Court's stance, upholding statutory provisions according different treatment to the sexes as long as such
classifications were "based upon reasonable and not arbitrary or
capricious or unjustly discriminating differences. '"
Whereas ERA's sponsors uniformly desired that the amendment
promote equality of rights more vigorously than had judicial implementation of the fourteenth amendment, proponents have taken
divergent views on the proper approach for its application. While
few propose that any equal rights amendment, federal or state,
should abolish all classification based on sex, many argue that to
guarantee an effective system of equality sex as a basis for distinction should be prohibited in all but a few instances.3 4 Laws dealing
with unique physical characteristics inherent in one sex 3 or laws
32. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), where the Supreme Court rejected a Utah
probate code provision which gave mandatory preference to men over women when both
applied for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate. Reed was the first case in
which the Supreme Court overruled a sexual classification as unreasonable and was decided
after the passage of Pennsylvania's ERA. See also Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 28,
at 685 n.1l.
33. Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 648, 243 A.2d 400, 403 (1968). In Daniel, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "A classification by sex alone would not, per se, offend
the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. For example, there are undoubtedly significant biological, natural and practical differences between men and women
which would justify, under certain circumstances, the establishment of different . . .standards." Id. at 649, 243 A.2d at 403.
34. One commentator has observed:
The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is that sex is not a permissible
factor in determining the legal rights of women, or of men. This means that the
treatment of any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance that such
person is one sex or the other. The law does, of course, impose different benefits or
different burdens upon different members of the society. That differentiation in treatment may rest upon particular characteristics or traits of the persons affected, such
as strength, intelligence, and the like. But under the Equal Rights Amendment the
existence of such a characteristic or trait to a greater degree in one sex does not justify
classification by sex rather than by the particular characteristic or trait. Likewise the
law may make different rules for some people than for others on the basis of the activity
they are engaged in or the function they perform. But the fact that in our present
society members of one sex are more likely to be found in a particular activity or to
perform a particular function does not allow the law to fix legal rights by virtue of
membership in that sex. In short, sex is a prohibited classification.
Brown, supra note 29, at 889.
35. Laws which classify on the basis of a physical characteristic, present in all or some of
one sex but not in any member of the opposite sex, would not contravene the ERA and would
be reviewable under conventional constitutional grounds. For example, wet nurses and sperm
donors could be regulated as classes. Id. at 893-96. See also Equal Rights Amendment, supra
note 28, at 715-16.
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protecting personal privacy36 would be among the few exceptions.
Another view is that the ERA was the legislative enactment of sex
as a suspect classification.3 7 Rejecting an absolute approach as too
rigid, proponents of this view suggest the adoption of a standard
comparable to the strict scrutiny test applied to classifications
based on race or national ancestry. 3 To justify a sexual classification, the state would be required to demonstrate a compelling state
39
interest.
It is unclear what approach was intended by the Pennsylvania
legislature when it enacted the Pennsylvania ERA. Recorded legislative history of the ERA is almost nonexistent;" that which exists
does not disclose what standard should be used to implement the
ERA. Perhaps as a result of the court's difficulty in discerning legislative intent, decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involving the ERA have been less than clear in delineating what standard
the court was using in testing the validity of sex-based classifications.4 Although the court has consistently invalidated challenged
statutes and rules, using language connoting an intolerance for sex
as a classifying device,42 it had not expressly adopted an absolute
approach 3 and had frequently interspersed its rationales with language and concepts reminiscent of fourteenth amendment rational
basis analysis.44 In Commonwealth v. Butler,45 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found violative of the ERA a state law providing for
disparate sentencing treatment of men and women convicted of
36. This exception would permit sex-segregated facilities such as rest rooms and institutional sleeping quarters, in order to protect an individual's constitutional right to privacy.
See Brown, supra note 29, at 900-02.
37. See ConstitutionalAmendment, supra note 31, at 1499-524. But see Brown, supra note
29, at 892: "The issue under the Equal Rights Amendment cannot be... suspect classification . . . . Equality of rights means that sex is not a factor."
38. ConstitutionalAmendment, supra note 31, at 1523.
39. See note 31 supra.
40. In Pennsylvania, minimal attempt is made to document the legislative history of
statutory and constitutional enactments. See Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 28, at
684; 14 DUQ. L. REv. 101, 106 n.39 (1975).
41. Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 28, at 717.
42. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 101, 327 A.2d 60, 62 (1974), where the
court stated: "The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no longer a permissible factor in
the determination of their legal rights and legal responsibilities." See also Conway v. Dana,
456 Pa. 536, 539, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa. 90, 93, 320 A;2d 139,
140 (1974).
43. See Equal Rights Amendment, supra note 28, at 717.
44. Id.
45. 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974).
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certain crimes, prefacing its discussion with a strong statement
against using sex as a classifying tool." However, Butler contains
language implying that the classification failed because it had no
rational basis and affected a fundamental right.'7 The Pennsylvania
ERA cases generally indicate an approach which has been characterized as falling somewhere between a rational basis test and an
absolute application of the ERA." While the cases all concern a
classification that would have failed an absolute prohibition against
sex-based classifications, in each instance, the court did not strike
the classification without first giving careful scrutiny to the sexbased characteristics purportedly justifying different treatment." If
the characteristic was not peculiar to one sex or if the difference in
treatment would not further the legislative objective, the classification was held invalid.50
Walker's complete absence of judicial consideration of possible
justification for the distinction between unwed mothers and unwed
fathers is the strongest evidence that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has adopted an absolute approach in implementing Pennsylvahia's ERA. By holding that classification based on sex violates the
constitutional amendment, the court in Walker never had to inquire
whether the classification furthered a compelling state interest or
whether a rational basis existed for the distinction. While adoption
of an absolute approach in implementing the ERA will provide certainty in an area where clarification was needed, such a stance is
amenable to criticism that a per se rule with no exceptions is undesirably rigid, leaving no room for statutes which may properly reflect inherent differences between the sexes or which promote personal bodily privacy.5 ' Arguably, there are certain instances where
the sexes should be classified differently. The posture which the
46. Id. at 296, 328 A.2d at 855.
47. "We perceive no basis, let alone a rational basis, for predicating eligibility for parole
on a person's sex." Id. at 298, 328 A.2d at 856. The court characterized a person's interest in
freedom from confinement as fundamental public policy. Id. at 297, 328 A.2d at 856.
48. See 14 DuQ. L. REV. 101, 108 (1975).
49. Id.
50. For example, in Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974), the court found
financial capability to be the crucial characteristic underlying the responsibility to support
minor children, a capability which could equally be present in the mother. Moreover, the
court found that the primary purpose of support-the welfare of the child-is not fostered
by a presumption that the father always must accept the principal support burden while the
mother, solely because of her sex, is incapable of contributing. Id. at 539, 318 A.2d at 326.
51. See ConstitutionalAmendment, supra note 31, at 1523.
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supreme court took in Walker nonetheless seems the proper one.
Instead of retreating from a per se approach, the court can best deal
with fears that under such a reading, the ERA will sweep too
broadly, by carefully delineating what exceptions should exist to the
rule that sex is a prohibited classification.52
The language used in Walker is clearly absolutist. Since the legislative history of the Pennsylvania ERA is inconclusive as to whether
such an. approach was intended, and because the language of the
ERA is certainly amenable to a reading that sex is an invalid basis
for legal distinction,53 the result in Walker is defensible. Pennsylvania courts should not be reluctant to accept the full requirements
of such a reading. Adherence to Walker and its absolute reading of
the ERA will provide a needed measure of certainty and will lighten
the judicial load, since courts need no longer weigh the state interest
involved in a sex-based classification. Moreover, any undesirable
restraint on the legislature can be obviated by the courts carving out
whatever limited exceptions are deemed appropriate. Walker'
should stand as a significant clarification of the ERA decisions of
the past. The only question remaining should be what exceptions,
if any, should be permitted to the clear statement in Walker that
sex is a prohibited classification in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Kim C. Kesner
52.
53.

See Brown, supra note 29, at 889-902.
See note 7 supra for the language of the Pennsylvania ERA.

